Subjectivity in Art History and Art Criticism by Eleni Gemtou
 
 
Subjectivity in Art History and Art Criticism 
 
Eleni Gemtou  
University of Athens, Greece 
 
 
Abstract 
Art history and art criticism belong in a wider sense to the humanities, whose aim is the 
interpretation and comprehension of human actions and intellectual work.  Both fields 
draw  their  basic  methodological tools  from  the  hermeneutical  tradition.    Their  central 
analytic  category is  comprehension  (verstehen)  that seeks  to  ascribe meaning  to  the 
spirit of these actions, or to works of art.  The intention of the art historian is to analyse 
and integrate artistic works in a wider intellectual and social frame, while the aim of the 
art critic is to examine the values connected with artistic creations.  Their roles are not 
always distinguishable, as analysis, comprehension, interpretation and evaluation often 
co-exist in the studies of both fields.  However, the approach of the art historian should 
have a scientific character, aiming at objectively valid formulations, while the critic should 
give equal consideration to subjective factors, acknowledging international artistic values, 
often taking on the additional role of philosopher or theorist of art. In my paper I examine 
the varying degrees of subjectivity in the approaches of art historians and art critics.  I 
give emphasis to the methods and language both use, while I approach the categories of 
artistic values (aesthetic, moral, cognitive) according to their subjective usage, but also to 
their role in the comprehension and evaluation of art.  My conviction is that art history and 
art criticism are complementary activities, as the former creates fertile conditions for the 
latter’s complete and essential evaluations. 
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Art history and art criticism belong in a wider sense to the humanities, the 
third  largest  scientific  field,  which  has  distinguishable  purposes  and 
methodologies  from  the  other  two,  the  analytic-empirical  and  the  normative 
sciences
1. The humanities aim at the interpretation and the comprehension of 
human actions and intellectual works by drawing their basic methodological tools 
from  the  hermeneutical  tradition.    Their  central  analytic  category  is 
comprehension (verstehen) that seeks to ascribe meaning by a kind of subjective 
transfer  to  the  spirit  of  these  actions,  or  to  works  of  art
2.  Contrary  to  the 
nomological approach of the analytical sciences and the regulative-deontological 
approach  of  the  normative  sciences,  the  humanities  have  an  explicit  value-
orientation in their study of historical eras and cultural meanings. 
Art history and art criticism are intellectual activities aiming at the study, 
comprehension and interpretation of artworks. Their basic difference concerns 
not only the recentness of their objects, but also their objectives: the art historian 
studies the works of the past and, by using hermeneutical methods, constructs 
systems on a historical and theoretical base, while the art critic is interested in 
contemporary art, which he analyzes and interprets with the aim of evaluating it 
critically. In this sense the work of the art critic functions as an important tool and 
a basic substructure for future historians.  
 The  common  point  of  historical  and  critical  texts,  which  is  the 
comprehension and interpretation of artworks, depends to a large extent on their 
author’s  intuition,  perception  and  experience.  Following,  however 
conscientiously, their chosen methods and criteria, art historians (but also a large 
number  of  critics)  attempt  valid and  intersubjective  interpretations  that  will  be 
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judged  by  the  wider  hermeneutical  community  in  the  course  of  time.  For  the 
construction of systems and theories they usually follow a scientific methodology, 
and for articulating their conclusions they use a strict, unsentimental language. 
On the other hand, many art critics evaluate artworks, holding as a criterion and 
expressing their own aesthetic experience.  
This paper offers a meta-critical approach to critical and historical texts 
according  to  their  degrees  of  subjectivity.  Historical  and  critical  texts  are 
examined through three approaches, divided into the following sections:  
 
I.  Subjectivity as a direct intention of art historians and art critics.  
II.  The subjective factor in the analysis and interpretation of works of art. 
III.  Degrees of subjectivity in evaluative judgments.  
 
I. Subjectivity as a direct intention of art historians and art critics. 
The scientist, either belonging to the analytic-empirical faculty, or to the 
humanities, always begins his work from a personal motive in order to choose a 
field  or  an  object  to  investigate.  Inspiration,  selection  and  composing  of 
speculations  are  based  largely  on  his  creative  imagination,  hence  they  have 
subjective character. However, the analytical scientist is obliged in what follows 
to  free  himself  of  personal  motives  and  ideologies  in  order  to  submit  his 
theoretical constructions to strict empirical and logical controls with the aim of 
establishing objectivity. The purpose of the analytical sciences is the investigation 
and the explanation of the world can be achieved only if subjective factors have 
been minimized, as they may distort truth. Subjectivity, however, plays a decisive 
role in the humanities, which approach intellectual works and human action in an 
interpretive rather than explanatory manner.  
  Some art critics consciously incorporate their intentions into their texts, 
thus a meta-critical study must take them into serious consideration. In order to 
investigate the degrees of subjectivity, I distinguish three categories of texts
3: 
catalog essays for gallery and museum;  reviews published  in  art and other 
journalistic magazines; and monographs  on contemporary art,  which have  the  
character of  philosophical  essays.  
In catalog essays, the critic, working on behalf of the gallery, museum or 
the artist, always articulates a positive evaluation. In his effort to accent the work 
and its creator he/she analyzes and interprets it, attempting to include it within a 
wider artistic era or tradition. In this framework, references and comparisons to 
the past or to modern recognized artists often function as tools for advancing the 
artist and his work. 
The method of historicized criticism falls within the more general attempt 
to find a stable reference-framework in order to create rational evaluations.
4 Until 
the middle of 19th cen., critics evaluated contemporary art in relation to works of 
certain past artists or styles: renaissance art of the Quattrocento was judged with 
reference to antiquity, while at the end of this period Raphael and Michelangelo 
functioned as reference points. In 18
th century France, after the intense conflicts 
between the partisans of Rubens and Poussin, a return once again to the models 
of ancient Greece and Rome has been observed. Within the conflict between 
"ancients  and  moderns,"  paragons  were  sought  in  the  ancient  arts  or  in  the 
modern era.  With the appearance of the avant-garde at the end of the 19th cen. 
and the promotion of the criterion of artistic newness as a standard of judgment, 
criticism based upon a historicized approach lost its basis. Soon, however, the 4  Rupkatha Journal  Vol 2 No 1 
 
 
system  of  artistic  "modernism"  was  constructed,  which  posited  a  momentum 
generated by a sequence of works and which confronted 20
th century art. as a 
unit with a straight development along a definable trajectory. The value of avant-
garde works was judged in relation, on the one hand, to recent modern works, 
and on the other, according to their contribution to the development of pioneering 
art
5  
Thus, comparisons of contemporary artworks to past standards, recent or 
distant, have their roots in the historicized criticism that bloomed between the 
15th and the 19th cen. and today remains in use. Its aim is the promotion of 
contemporary  works,  by  showing  that  they  are  equally  important  as  past 
standards, but also that they play an important role as parts of the evolutionary 
chain of art. On the other hand, such comparisons give critical essays prestige 
and intersubjective validity: the critic doesn’t express his subjective opinion, but 
by identifying a contemporary artwork with a timeless masterpiece, it’s as if the 
critic is speaking on behalf of the wider art world.  
The language in some catalog essays is poetic; it acquires literary value. 
Most catalog essays serve a double aim to promote the artist and to appear in 
themselves  as  autonomous  “artworks”  that  give  aesthetic  satisfaction  to  the 
reader
6. In both cases the aim is to positively predispose the reader or the visitor 
to an exhibition with all that this entails. Their meta-critical study, however, should 
be  based  as  much  on  the  criterion  of  formal  truth  as  on  aesthetic  criteria, 
because  their  validity  and  their  intersubjective  acceptance  depend  on  both 
parameters.  
Language is often used differently in reviews published in newspapers 
and magazines, as these serve a different aim: the critic doesn’t work on behalf 
of  the  artist,  but  for  an  institution  that  presents  and  analyzes  tendencies  in 
modern and contemporary art. His intention is to record thorough and illuminating 
approaches to artworks, which contribute to their comprehension and evaluation 
by the audience.   
Lately, there has been a tendency of avoiding evaluative judgments in 
journalistic reviews: emphasis is given instead to describing and interpreting the 
works in objective terms. It’s a revival of the positivist critical tradition that has its 
roots in 19
th century Germany, where the sovereignty of the natural sciences and 
their  methods  prompted  the  extension  of  methodological  monism  to  the 
humanities. However, explanatory approaches to artistic and intellectual works 
can  only  have  a  limited  scope,  as  they  aren’t  capable  of  determining  them 
completely.  A  positivist  review  doesn’t  refer  to  the  values  that  make  a  work 
interesting and capable of creating aesthetic experience; rather it describes it in 
the same way that a scientist would describe a natural phenomenon. But even in 
this  case,  language  plays  a  decisive  role:  intelligently-selected  words  with  a 
descriptive-ontological  character  simultaneously  function  as  evaluative 
judgments
7.  
Monographs on modern and contemporary art often have the character of 
philosophical  aesthetics  essays.  Changes  in  the  20th  cen.  rendered  the 
existence of a theoretical and philosophical substructure necessary in order to 
redefine the art and justify avant-garde works
8 Characteristic examples are The 
Transfiguration of the Commonplace by A. Danto, or  The  Originality  of  the  
Avant - Garde  and  other  modernist  myths  by Rosalind  Krauss . Originating in 
post-modern works the above texts treat questions that concern the definition of 
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objects, (as for example the copies of authentic works by  Sherrie  Levine). The 
language used is direct, often narrative, with many examples from the artistic era 
and  references  to  established  philosophical  theories,  which  justify  personal 
positions.  A  philosophical  essay  begins  with  questions  and  speculations  of  a 
subjective  character  and  aspires  to  answer  them  with  logical  and  inductive 
arguments.  The  wider  and  longer-lasting  the  acceptance  of  the  philosophical 
theory by philosophers, critics and readers, the more powerful its intersubjective 
character.  
In art-historical monographs the writer also begins from personal motives: 
he selects his research field according to his subjective mood and preference for 
certain artists, movements or periods or because he judges that there is a gap in 
research that should be filled with new and original interpretations. In opposition, 
however,  to  certain  art  critics,  the  historian  does  not  embed  in  his  texts  his 
feelings, but attempts to keep an essential distance from the research object, 
using a strict, systematic language without sentimental effusions and subjective 
judgments.  
Two kinds of art-historical writings exist: narrative and theory. In narrative 
the art  historian aims  to  make a  story out of  the  interpreted  works of  art by 
arranging them in a certain order, deciding which work to include or to exclude 
and stressing some works over others. When constructing a theory, on the other 
hand, the art historian has an explanatory orientation and aims to include the 
works  in  a  theoretical  framework.  Theories  in  art  history  seek  for  underlying 
principles  that  would  both  explain  a  work’s  specific  historicity  and  provide 
sufficient continuity with the past, which would allow the art historian to explain 
historical transformations.  
 
II. The subjective factor in the analysis and interpretation of works of art 
I  have  distinguished  two  categories  of  texts  according  to  the  writer’s 
intentions: texts that are characterized by the undiluted subjective positions of 
their  writers  (generally  catalog  essays),  and  those  that  use  a  scientific 
methodology and language for a more objective approach. Now, I will attempt a 
closer  examination  of  the  second  group  in  order  to  show  that,  despite  the 
intentions of the writers, the subjective factor plays a decisive role in these texts. 
Considering that interpretation is the common methodological tool in art history 
and art criticism, I will examine the iconographical and iconological theories of 
Erwin  Panofsky,  which  are  two  of  the  most  accepted  and  intersubjective 
hermeneutical  methods,  and  still  used  by  art  historians  as  by  art  critics  until 
today. 
Before proceeding, however, I would like to clarify the criteria and the 
terminology that I will use to approach the above methods. I evaluate the content 
of a method on the criterion of “formal” truth, in order to show that it is valid. I 
have borrowed the term “formal” truth from the formal sciences of mathematics 
and logic, where truth does not refer to a correspondence to the objective world, 
but is the result of the logical structure of propositions. I make two approaches to 
the writings based on the criterion of subjectivity: first, an aesthetic approach that 
explores  the  way  a  theory  is  articulated  (the  style  of  the  argumentation  and 
language).  According  to  this  approach,  a  theory  can  be  either  subjective  or 
objective.  Second,  an  empirical  approach,  which  explores  the  scope  of  the 
acceptance  of  a  theory.  According  to  this  approach  a  theory  can  be  either 
subjective (meaning that it was not accepted by anyone beyond its conceiver), or 6  Rupkatha Journal  Vol 2 No 1 
 
 
intersubjective  (meaning  that  a  large  number  of  people  accepted  it  and  was 
probably influenced by it in the passage of time). 
Panofsky  aimed at  the  construction  of general  principles,  by  which  all 
artworks could be analyzed and interpreted, independent of their time and local 
conditions. He considered the artwork not only as a direct result of the culture 
that gave rise to it, but also as the result of concrete tendencies of the human 
mind.  Based  on  this  double-faceted  interpretation  of  artworks,  Panofsky 
attempted  to  solve  the  hermeneutical  problem
9  by  claiming  that  completed 
interpretations are those that approach the work not only as a part of its historical 
and cultural era, but also as a human construction.   
At the same time he approached the artistic work as a combination of 
form  and  content,  rejecting  the  absolute  formalistic  hermeneutical  system  of   
Heinrich    Woelfflin
10.  Woelfflin claimed that our sensory organs spontaneously 
give order to the chaotic world of phenomena, independent of the expressive and 
intellectual faculties of the brain.  Panofsky believed that the classification of the 
sense  data  is        an  activity  of  the  higher  faculties  of  mind  that  are  shaped 
according to the expressions and the content of the outside world. He did not 
accept the differentiation between form and content, as – contrary to Woelfflin – 
he claimed that changes in style imply changes in the content of the work as well. 
Thus,  valid  formal  principles  could  not  result  only  through  empirical 
observations
11.  
Within this framework he formulated a theory based on the internal formal 
qualities  of the  artistic  work,  which are  the  result  of  the  relation  of form  and 
content
12. His system consisted of opposite pairs, plenitude / form, time / space,  
haptic / optic values,   depth/surface and merging / divided forms
13, which have 
not only a universal character and reflect the relation of the  mind and the work of 
art
14, but they should also function as the means of controlling the relation of its 
form and content. Panofsky believed that by constructing an objective framework 
for  the  analysis  of  the  artistic  works  subjective  –psychological  interpretations 
could be avoided, as they lead to privatized and emotionalized conceptions of art.  
Panofsky was influenced as much by Warburg as by the hermeneutical 
tradition of the 19th century, which emphasized the distance of the interpreter 
from  the  interpreted  object  and  underlined  the  huge  difficulties  that  exists  in 
interpreting artworks in the framework of their historical era. Panofsky disagreed 
with Heidegger
15, who had stressed the subjective parameters of interpretation, 
by constructing control and balance systems restricting subjectivity.  
With  his article  “ Zum  Problem  der  Beschreibung  und  Inhaltsdeutung  
von  Werken  der  bildenden  Kunst “
16 Panofsky introduced the hermeneutical 
method in art history, based to some degree on Dilthey’s theories. Both believed 
that  valid  interpretations  are  those  whose  every  part  is  dependent  on  the 
interpretation of the whole
17. Dilthey, though, had recognized a close connection 
between the work and its creator, interpreting it with the artist’s intentions as the 
basic criterion.  Panofsky, on the other hand, didn’t aim at the localization of the 
artist’s subjective intentions, as he considered it to be impossible, even though 
these might exist in the form of a written document by the artist. He conceived art 
history as a history of changing relations between mind and world. Art was for 
him  a  type  of  knowledge,  in  the  framework  of  which  the  subject  becomes 
objective, independent and public.   
Panofsky’s iconological method is a hermeneutical approach to art that is 
immediately connected to a “general history of the human spirit”. It constitutes the 7  Subjectivity in Art History and Art Criticism 
 
 
 
third stage of his hermeneutical model
18  that was completed in 1955. Its first 
stage  is  the  pre-iconographical  description  (that  constitutes  the  application  of 
Woelfflin’s formalistic theory) and its second stage is the iconographical analysis 
(influenced by Warburg
19). Panofsky converged with Warburg in his conviction 
that  for  the  right  comprehension  of  an  artwork  essential  conditions  exist:  the 
connection of the work to its culture as realized through the interpretation of its 
content in analogy with the content of literary works and the connection of its 
content to corresponding past iconographic types in the framework of a history of 
types.  The  third  stage,  the  iconological  interpretation
20,  aims  at  a  deeper 
comprehension of the work beyond the conscious:  Panofsky wanted to reveal 
the  ways  that  works  harmonize  subjective  impetuses  and  objective 
comprehension  of  the  world.  In  order  to  ensure,  however,  the  objectivity  of  
interpretation,  that  is  realized  through  a  type  of  synthetic  intuition  and  is 
determined  to  a  large  extent  by  the  interpreter’s  psychology  and  his 
“Weltanschaungen  ”,  he  proposes  corrective    principles    such  as    general  
knowledge  of cultural  history  and also a  familiarity  with  what  he  regarded to  
be  the  human  mind’s  essential  tendencies throughout  history. 
In spite of these corrective principles, the history of the particular method 
reveals  that  the  interpreters  have  often  approached  works  according  to  their   
personal  worldviews.    Thus,  for  example,  while  Panofsky  interprets  Durer’s 
“Melancholia I” in humanist terms, the German art historian Konrad Hoffmann 
(1978) includes the same work in medieval art and considers Durer as a pious 
aristocrat of this era and worldview
21.  
The  existence  of  multiple  interpretations  doesn’t  refute  the  validity  of 
Panofsky’s theory, but reveals that despite his systematic efforts, the subjective 
factor  remains  decisive,  as  the  interpreter  cannot  approach  the  work 
independently from his conception of the world and art. It’s generally recognized, 
however, that his interpretations have shaped a tradition, have been established 
and have influenced many later art historians: this means that they have gained 
an intersubjective character
22.  
Panofsky’s  worldview  though  has  determined  his  choices  and  his 
hermeneutical approaches. His basic research object was Italian renaissance art 
and the larger part of his theory was based on its fundamental principles. The 
notion of balance, used in relation to his five opposite pairs as a criterion for the 
evaluation and the nomination of "great" works of art, certainly emanates from the 
humanist critical tradition. All his choices are understood as consequences of his 
humanist bent: he indirectly absorbs Bellori’s theory about the hierarchy in the 
categories of painting, with the allegorical and historical images dominating over 
landscapes,  everyday  scenes,  portraits and  still-lives,  as  all his  analyses and 
interpretations concern the two first categories
23. Another example is given by his 
interpretations of  Duerer’s work, especially those that investigate  the relation of 
the  artist  to  Italian  renaissance  art
24.  Panofsky  considers  Durer’s  work  as  a 
collision  between  the  empirical  northern  tradition  and  the  theoretical  idealistic 
approach of the Italian School, which he definitely promotes as being supreme. 
As  Sveltlana  Alpers
25  observes:  “if  we  turn  to  Panofsky's  masterful  study  of 
Durer,  it’s  characteristic  that  he  sees  Durer  as  a  kind  of  captive of the  alien 
northern darkness struggling toward the southern light”. 
Panofskys’  interpretations  of  Durer’s  work  are  connected  with  his 
humanist bent and have a subjective origin
26. Their clarity, however, their internal 
cohesion, their logical sequence and their thorough sourcing render them valid, 8  Rupkatha Journal  Vol 2 No 1 
 
 
while the language used lends them an objective character, at least at a first 
reading.  A  critical  reading,  though  demonstrates  the  intrusion  of  evaluative 
judgments that have a subjective base. Consider, for example, a simile he uses 
in  his  book  “Early    Netherlandish    Painting  ”
27  that  relates  the  spectator’s 
aesthetic  experience  when  seeing    Van    Eyck’s  work:  “From    the    sheer  
sensuous  beauty  of  a  genuine  Jan  van  Eyck  there  emanates  a  strange  
fascination  not  unlike  that  which  we  experience  when  permitting  ourselves  
to  be  hypnotized  by  precious  stones  or  when  looking  into  deep  water”. It’s 
definitely a subjective judgment in the form of a simile that splits the objective and 
distanced language, and at the same time lends it aesthetic value.  
 
III. Degrees of subjectivity in evaluative judgments 
Evaluative judgments are those that refer to the values of the artworks 
and are included as much in the texts of art criticism, as in the narrations and the 
theories of art history. They cover the larger part of the description, the analysis 
and the interpretation of the works, as in art there exists an identification between 
facts and values. The “pure" facts of the artistic works are their dimensions, their 
materials, their date and the artist’s signature, while form and content function as 
carriers of values: the world of an artistic work is an imaginary world of values, 
thoughts,  wishes  and  sentiments  (even  though  the  content  of  the  work  is 
naturalistic, presenting a direct equivalence to reality). Objects or facts that in an 
empirical approach are evaluative neutral acquire in art symbolic character and 
evaluative significance.  
Evaluative judgments play a sovereign role in the humanities, contrary to 
their  position  in  the  analytic-empirical  sciences.  There  exists  a  clear 
differentiation  between  ontological–descriptive  propositions  and  evaluative 
judgments,  with  the first having  explicit  informative  character and  the  second 
expressing  the  attitude  and  subjective  feelings  of  the  one  using  them.  An 
evaluative judgment cannot result from a fact, or as Hume remarks (1739-40): 
"an  ought  cannot  be  derived  from  an is ". Hence evaluative judgments do not 
constitute part of the scientific work in the analytical sciences that are directed to 
the explanation of reality. In the case of art, however, where facts and values are 
identified,  evaluative  judgments  constitute  a  basic  methodological  tool  of  art 
history and art criticism.  
At the beginning of my paper I claimed that the art historian interprets 
artworks in order to include them in a historical and theoretical system, while the 
art critic follows similar methods to evaluate artworks. This distinction does not 
concern the use of evaluative judgments that is common in both activities, but the 
intentions of the scholars who include themselves in one or the other occupation.  
Nevertheless, two kinds of evaluations exist: first, evaluations which are 
the  result  of  logical  and  critical  procedures.  These  are  based  on  complete 
interpretations and are justified by the interpreter’s reasoned explanations; and 
refer to the significance of artworks not only in their historical era but also in the 
development of art in general. Thus, these neither emanate from the subjective 
preferences  of  the  evaluator,  nor  are  they  connected  with  the  criteria  and 
dominating  values  of  the  evaluator’s  era.    Such  evaluative  judgments  are 
characteristic of art-historical writing and play an important role in art criticism. 
The second kind of evaluations derives from pure aesthetic approaches and it 
has a subjective character. Interpretation is not presupposed and the evaluator is 
not  committed  to  giving  logical  reasons  for  his  judgments.  Such  evaluative 9  Subjectivity in Art History and Art Criticism 
 
 
 
judgments  dominate  in  catalog  essays  and  some  reviews,  especially  those 
belonging to  the  postmodern  era,  which functions  as  carriers  of  the  energies 
created within and the impact of artworks upon the reviewer
28. 
The language used in historical and critical texts is often constituted of 
words that are metaphorical and comparative, characterizing the works not only 
in their own terms, but also in the terms of their creator’s feelings and action, or 
of their  recipient’s and interpreter’s reaction to them
29. The last group of words is 
usually  avoided  by  historians  and  critics  who  aim  at  a  more  distanced  and 
objective approach to the works, but dominate in catalog essays and journalistic 
reviews.  
The conviction that aesthetic values are facts connected with the form of 
the artistic works is explicitly formulated in the formalistic theories of Roger Fry 
and  Clive  Bell,  in  the  framework  of  which  formalism  was  changed  from  an 
hermeneutical method aiming at the comprehension of the work to a criterion of 
evaluation. Both scholars considered as appreciable only the works dominated 
by “pure form”, as no margin could exist for “associated ideas”
30. These theories 
are grounded in philosophical naturalism, in the framework of which aesthetic 
values  are  the  intrinsic  qualities  of  aesthetic  objects  and  become  perceptible 
through the senses.   
Contrary  to  naturalism,  idealism  conceives  aesthetic  values  as 
supernatural entities independent from the senses. They exist in the artistic work 
only as the reflections of the ideal values and the sensitive recipients conceive 
them  intuitively.  Influenced  by  Plato’s  philosophy,  idealists  cultivated  a 
transcendental theory of beauty that has led to the creation of an idealized art 
from  the  Renaissance to  the 19th  cen. A  third  philosophical  approach  to the 
ontology of aesthetic values is subjectivism that does not accept their existence 
as  elements  of  the  natural  world,  but  only  as  our  intellectual  or  sentimental 
constructions.  
The  above  philosophical  theories  that  investigate  the  degrees  of 
subjectivity in the way that we conceive values, are idealism defining them as 
ideal  elements  of  the  world  completely  independent  from  us;  naturalism,  as 
natural  elements  conceived  through  the  senses,  and  subjectivism,  as  our 
intellectual constructions. All of these can lead to an extreme relativism that of 
course complicates a rational evaluation of art. The fact however, that during 
history  there  have  existed constant and  unchangeable aesthetic  values  lends 
them  intersubjective  force:  even  if  we  accept  that  values  are  human 
constructions, we cannot ignore the fact that there exists a common sense of 
beauty, a “sensus  communis”  in all humans that has lead to the admiration of 
concrete aesthetic facts and objects through the ages
31. Sunsets, for example, 
will always be a subject of  admiration to most humans, as also the great works of 
art of the  past that, even in the modern era, where the traditional standards of 
beauty have been disputed, are recognized as brilliant by the larger part of the 
artworld. Our eyes will always be drawn by concrete combinations of colours or 
by the principles of symmetry and balance, even if different historical periods and 
art-institutions  impose  different  models
32.  In  this  sense  the  degree  of  the 
subjectivity  of  aesthetic  judgments    is  limited  not  only  by  the  intersubjective 
character of concrete values that lends them universal force, but also by rules 
accepted as absolute in each era, either through important theoretical texts (eg. 
Aristotle’s  "Poetic"),  or  through  the  artistic  tendencies  that  dominate  and 
determine the notion of taste
33. 10  Rupkatha Journal  Vol 2 No 1 
 
 
Moral  values  that  exist  in  the  content  of  visual  works  also  have  an 
intersubjective  base.    According  to  Hume's  account  of  moral  action  in  his 
“Treatise on Human Nature”, all humans are naturally moved by a ` moral sense' 
or ` sympathy', which is essentially a capacity to share the feelings of happiness 
or misery of others.  However, works of art should not be evaluated on moral 
criteria, but only on aesthetic ones. Moral judgments are included in the analysis 
and  interpretation of artworks, but  they  shouldn’t  be  considered as  means of 
evaluation. Moral values in art should be approached in aesthetic terms: when 
we  evaluate a  work  we  shouldn’t  be  interested  in  its  content, but  in  the  way 
content  is  expressed.  Thus,  when  Dave  Hickey
34  evaluates  the  homosexual 
photographs  of  Robert  Mapplethorpe  he  characterizes  them  as  examples  of 
"formal beauty" and doesn’t touch upon moral parameters. He uses evaluative 
judgments that result from concrete aesthetic qualities of these photographs, as 
chiaroscuro and balance, which have an intersubjective and universal character, 
creating aesthetic satisfaction independent from the content.  
The evaluations of artworks should also not be based on their cognitive 
values, since art doesn’t aim at objective truth, but functions more as a motive for 
awakening  and  renewing  ways  of  perceiving  reality.  An  artwork  can  include 
cognitive and scientific elements, which however are presented in an aesthetic 
manner offering aesthetic satisfaction rather than enlargement of knowledge.   
 
Conclusions  
According to the above approaches to art criticism and art history on the 
criterion of subjectivity, both intellectual activities converge (with the exception of 
the  catalog  essays  and  some  journalistic  reviews).  The  analysis,  the 
interpretation  and  the  evaluation  of  artworks,  as  the  common  element  of  the 
texts, have to a large extent a subjective character, which however does not 
negate  their  validity  or  downgrade  them  to  products  of  simple  inspirational 
activities.   
Art  historians  and  art  critics  who  seriously  serve  their  occupation, 
investigate methods and corrective principles in order to ensure the validity of 
their texts, but also to limit the subjective aspects produced from unverifiable and 
idiosyncratic expressions. They systematically control the logical cohesion of their 
theories, while they interpret the works based on the sum of information they 
have about them and their era, investigate and reveal their interrelations and their 
integration in a historical, theoretical and cultural system. They evaluate them, 
finally, either directly or indirectly through the choice of words that reveal their 
hidden personal estimations.  
The  aesthetic-linguistic  evaluations  of  the  texts  show  their 
subjective/objective  character,  while  empirical  studies  that  concern  their 
longstanding acceptance by the scientific community reveal their intersubjectivity. 
The  underpinning  theory,  that  the  only  valid  interpretation  is  the  one  that 
emanates from the creator himself, cannot   be valid.  Even if it’s confirmed by a 
personal oral or written testimony of the artist its acceptance as the only genuine 
and  objective  interpretation,  would  downgrade  the  uniqueness  of  the  artistic 
phenomenon: the artwork is differentiated from natural objects or phenomena 
because, beyond its objective dimension, it has an indefinable intellectual depth 
with multiple levels of reading and interpretation. The relation between the work 
and  the  viewer  is  multidimensional  and  permanently  altered,  offering  infinite 
possibilities of aesthetic satisfaction and enlargement of our thought.  11  Subjectivity in Art History and Art Criticism 
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1 The sciences are divided into three categories, according to their methodologies and 
purposes: The analytical sciences aim at the objective truth and the explanation of the 
world. They apply a nomological approach in order to include their results in a framework 
of laws and regularities. To the analytical sciences belong the natural and social sciences 
(empirical sciences), and also mathematics and logic (formal sciences). The normative 
sciences research ways of regulating the world. They apply a regulative-deontological 
approach  and  their  methodology  is  based  on  principles  that  imply  criteria  of  right  or 
wrong. The most significant normative sciences are Law and Ethics. The Humanities aim 
at  the  interpretation  and  comprehension  of  human  actions  and  intellectual  works  by 
drawing their basic methodological tools from the hermeneutical tradition. Their central 
analytic category is “comprehension” (“verstehen”) that seeks to ascribe meaning, in a 
kind of subjective transfer, to the spirit of these actions, or to works of art. They are value-
oriented. To the Humanities belong, among others, Art History and Art Criticism. 
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observer’s, as is the case for the scientific researcher in the natural and social sciences. 
However,  Gadamer  challenged  this  differentiation  by  applying  hermeneutics  in  all 
cognitive regions and by perceiving interpretation as our only means of approaching and 
understanding the world. According to him interpretation is an ontological event reflecting 
the interaction between interpreter and interpreted object. 
3 James Elkins (in: What happened to Art Criticism, Prickly Paradigm Press, Chicago, 
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descriptive art criticism and  poetic art criticism. 
4 Two kinds of intentional approach to artworks lead to their evaluation, a rational and an 
emotional one. The critic who prefers the rational approach is obliged to have certain 
fixed  reference  points,  in  order  to  make  reasoned  comparisons  and  justify  his/her 
judgments on logical arguments. Such fixed reference points are universally recognized 
artworks  of  the  distant  or  recent  past,  or  intersubjective  aesthetic  values.  Emotional 
evaluations  are  preferred  by  most  postmodern  critics,  who  judge  the  impact  and  the 
sensation of artworks over their meaning and interpretation. Susan Sontag in “Against 
Interpretation”,1964,  (in: A. Neill & A. Ridley, The Philosophy of Art. Readings Ancient 
and  Modern,  Mc  Graw  Hill,  Boston,  1995,  pp.  457-465)  claimed  that  intellectual 
approaches to art are against its expressional capabilities and proposed that art reviews 
should not include rational interpretations and evaluations, but rather should function as 
artworks in themselves, which carry forth the energies of the evaluated piece. 
5 J. Ackermann, “On Judging Art without Absolutes”, Critical Inquiry, vol. 5, No. 3, 1979, 
pp. 446-7. 
6  In  2002,  a  survey  conducted  by  the  Columbia  University  National  Arts  Journalism 
Program found that judging art is the least popular goal among American art critics. The 
top three answers were first, describing artworks; second, providing historical context; 
and third, writing well (J. Elkins, What happened to Art Criticism, Prickly Paradigm Press, 
Chicago, 2003, pp. 12, 49). 
7 Elkins, 2003, p. 41.  
8 D. Carrier, “Philosophical Art Criticism”, Leonardo, Vol. 19, No 2, 1986, pp. 170-174 
9 The hermeneutical problem in art history concerns the finding of basic principles that 
allow the incorporation of artworks in their historical framework and also in the general 
system of  the development of art. Art theories try to answer both questions: what makes 
artworks  historically  specific,  and  what  motivates  changes  in  art.  For  a  general 
introduction to art theories, s. M. Hatt & Ch. Klonk, Art History. A critical Introduction to its 
Methods, Manchester University Press., Manchester, 2006. 12  Rupkatha Journal  Vol 2 No 1 
 
 
                                                                                                                                  
10 H.Woelfflin (in: Principles of Art History: The Problem of the Development of Style in 
Later Art (trans. M.D. Hottinger), George Bell, London, 1932 [1915]) provided general 
descriptive terms, which would capture the development of artistic vision across countries 
and ages. He proposed a set of five opposite pairs: linear versus painterly, plane versus 
recession,  closed  versus  open,  multiplicity  versus  unity  and  absolute  versus  relative 
clarity.  
11 E. Panofsky, “Der Begriff des Kunstwollens”, Zeitschrift fuer Aesthetik und allgemeine 
Kunstwissenschaft, 14, 1920, pp. 321-39. 
12 K. Moxey, “Panofsky’s Concept on Iconology and the Problem of Interpretation in the 
History of Art”, New Literary History, Vol. 17, No. 2, Interpretation and Culture, 1986, pp. 
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14 The definition of these five opposite pairs is the result of the influence of Kant’s theory 
on Panofsky, according to which humans don’t have knowledge of the objects of the 
world as they are in themselves, but only of appearances. We perceive and understand 
the world through certain perception forms and categories that are common in all human 
minds. Panofsky attempted to show that our minds also organize aesthetic experience 
acquired by art through certain forms of perception. 
15  M.  Heidegger,  Kant    und    das    Problem    der    Metaphysik  ,  Vol.  3,  1930,    in: 
Gesammtausgabe,ed. Friedrich Wilhelm von Herrmann et al., Klostermann,  Frankfurt am 
Mai, 1975 . 
16 Logos 21, 1932, pp. 103–119. 
17  This  is  the  notion  of  the  hermeneutical  circle  that  refers  –according  to  traditional 
hermeneutics- only to interpretations within the framework of the humanities. However, 
Heidegger and Gadamer radicalized it by promoting it as a feature of all knowledge and 
activity. 
18  O.Baetschmann  (in:  Einfuehrung  in  die  kunstgeschichtliche  Hermeneutik, 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt, pp.68-73) understands Panofsky’s three-
stage  model  as  a  supplemental  coexistence  of  scientific  and  hermeneutical methods. 
According  to  him,  Panofsky  aims,  in  his  iconology,  at  the  localisation  of  the  causal 
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avoiding  subjective  interpretations  he  applied  the  knowledge  of  the  history  of  types. 
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where  subjective  drives  and  objective  understanding  of  the  world  are  connected 
(Hatt&Klonk, 2006, pp.98-9). 
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were  certain  expressions  of  a  culture  that  revealed  the  ways  in  which  this  culture 
understood the world. They were determined by a set of a priori functions of the human 
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According  to  Panofsky,  perspective  is  a  symbolic form  which  expresses  the  ways  in 
which western civilization understood the notion of space from the Renaissance to the 13  Subjectivity in Art History and Art Criticism 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                  
19
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